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Abstract
This paper investigates the location selection decisions of Korean ﬁrms that established
manufacturing operations in the European Union (EU) during the period 1986-1997. We
assume that the major characteristics of each EU country are given and estimate the
probability of selecting a particular country using a conditional logit model. The results suggest
that Korean ﬁrms prefer to select a host country that has a large domestic market, low wage
rates, a high level of inward foreign direct investment, a high level of Korean imports, and low
interest rates.
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model, Korean multinationals, FDI in the EU
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I. Introduction
Korean ﬁrms recently accelerated their direct investments in the EU. Although foreign
direct investment (FDI) by Korean ﬁrms began in 1968, annual outﬂows of Korean FDI
remained below US$ 100 million until 1985. In the early 1980s, the government deregulated
the requirements for investors and for host countries, eliminated the prior approval system,
and allowed outward FDI in a broad range of industries. In the late 1980s, Korean ﬁrms began
 We wish to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are responsible for any
remaining errors.
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began internationalizing through FDI. The Korean government responded actively to the
internationalization of Korean ﬁrms, and in the late 1980s it further liberalized outward FDI
to accommodate the rapid increase and expansion of Korean ﬁrms in overseas markets.
With this liberalization, Korean ﬁrms were no longer required to get authorization from
the government for their overseas investments, and they were able to retain their foreign
proﬁts and to purchase foreign real estates. Partly owing to the new government policy, the
annual net outﬂow of FDI increased from US$ 157 million in 1986 to US$ 2,989 million in
1997. Initially, Korean direct investments had been concentrated in East Asia and North
America, with Korean manufacturing investment into the EU starting only in 1982, when
Samsung Electronics built a TV factory in Portugal. In 1998, however, the EU market grew to
about 16% of the total stock of Korean outward FDI, becoming one of the most important
FDI destinations for Korean ﬁrms, after North America (44%) and East Asia (29%). This
trend is expected to continue as the EU market expands and becomes more united.
Since the seminal work of Hymer (1960), most scholars specializing in international
business have focused their e#orts on the analysis of the monopolistic advantages of multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) (Kindleberger, 1969; Caves, 1971; Lall, 1980). However, since
Dunning (1980) emphasized the importance of locational advantages in his eclectic paradigm,
another group of researchers has been trying to investigate the location selection behavior of
MNEs. In this paradigm, MNEs are able to increase proﬁts by combining their monopolistic
advantages and locational advantages of host countries. In order to maximize the synergy
e#ects of these two types of advantages, MNEs are required to select production locations
amenable to their competitive strategies. Since Korean emerging multinationals are neither
su$ciently experienced in overseas manufacturing nor su$ciently strong in their monopolistic
advantages, it is important for them to select appropriate locations that enhance their existing
competencies or compensate for their weaknesses.
In this regard, this study is designed to investigate the location factors considered by
Korean ﬁrms when they select a European Union host country to establish manufacturing
subsidiaries. Thus, this study may be helpful in identifying how the location selection behavior
of Korean ﬁrms is linked to their EU production and distribution strategies. This paper also
provides insight into the potential future course of Korean FDI in the EU, by investigating
current patterns and by suggesting how European countries can attract more Korean manu-
facturing plants.
The EU market is composed of ﬁfteen countries, with disparate economic conditions and
institutional settings. As a result, ﬁrms require time-consuming feasibility studies when
selecting an appropriate host country. However, if we assume that the major characteristics of
each EU country are given, we can estimate the probability of selecting a particular country
using McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model.
The scope of analysis in this paper is conﬁned to Korean manufacturing ﬁrms that
established subsidiaries in the EU between 1986 and 1997. According to the Ministry of
Finance and Economy, there were a total of 117 Korean manufacturing investment projects in
the EU during this period. Among these, forty-six investments were made in the UK;
twenty-three in France; twenty in Germany; six in the Netherlands; ﬁve in Spain; four each in
Italy, Portugal and Ireland; three in Belgium; and one each in Austria and Denmark.
However, there were no direct investments in Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, or Sweden.
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which includes consumer electronics. Investment in this sector accounted for approximately 53
percent of the total amount of Korean manufacturing investment in the EU.
This paper is organized into sections as follows. The next section, Section II, surveys the
literature and sets up the research hypotheses. Section III provides a description of the
methodology by brieﬂy explaining the conditional logit model, and Section IV presents the
empirical results and their interpretation. The ﬁnal section sets out the conclusions.
II. Research Hypotheses
We reviewed the literature on the location selection patterns of MNEs in the EU prior to
establishing the hypotheses of our study. We discovered that only a few studies have tried to
investigate the location patterns of non-European ﬁrms in the EU, although a large number of
studies have focused on foreign ﬁrms in the United States. As the ﬁrst stage of our
investigation, it is worth examining studies that are concerned with the behavior of Japanese
or American MNEs in Europe.
Thomsen (1992) argues that Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms consider the national market
size of a host country to be very important in their location decisions, and usually sell two
thirds of their output in the local market. He also points out that Japanese ﬁrms tend to lower
information costs involved in direct investment by investing in markets with which they are
already familiar through previous export relationships. Heitger and Stehn (1990) conﬁrm that
Japanese direct investments in the EU are concentrated in industries with high e#ective
protection rates. Dunning and Cantwell (1991) show that labor supply, technological and
communications infrastructure, and incentives, have been important factors in the investment
decisions of Japanese ﬁrms in Europe. Balasubramanyam and Greenway (1992) suggest that
Japanese components’ suppliers have invested more in countries where the governments have
imposed local content requirements, because Japanese manufacturers in the EU prefer to
procure inputs from their a$liates. Scaperlanda and Balough (1983) conﬁrm that market size
signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the direct investment of US ﬁrms in Europe. Culem (1988) demon-
strates that market size, tari# barriers, and export ﬂows are important factors inﬂuencing U.
S. direct investments in Europe. In particular, the volume of exports from source to host
country has been highly correlated with the inward FDI of European countries, which implies
that US multinationals try to undertake direct investment in order to defend their export
markets.
Another group of researchers has been interested in explaining the behavior of MNEs
from Korea and from other developing countries. Jo (1981) argues that manufacturing ﬁrms
from newly industrializing countries tend to undertake FDI partly to increase or maintain
their present level of exports to industrial countries. However, only a handful of researchers
have tried to investigate the characteristics of Korean emerging multinationals. Euh and Min
(1986) mention that in the early 1980s, two representative Korean electronics producers had
established manufacturing facilities in industrial countries: one in the USA to circumvent
anti-dumping suits, and the other in Western Europe to gain access to a large market.
McDermott (1992) notes that the sudden growth of Korean direct investment in Europe
coincided with either the actual or the threatened imposition of anti-dumping duties on
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oriented motives in the electric and electronics sector. He suggests that Korean multinationals
tried to defend their shares in local markets by increasing manufacturing facilities in Europe
in response to rising regional economic blocs and the resulting protectionism. Jun and Yoon
(1995) assert that Korean direct investment in advanced countries (upstream investments)
can be regarded as defensive, because they are undertaken in order to defend export markets
from trade restrictions or from the competitive pressures of other MNEs from developing
countries.
They also mention that the conventional theories of FDI are not relevant in explaining
Korean direct investments in advanced regions, as these conventional theories imply that
multinational ﬁrms should possess some monopolistic advantages in order to compensate for
the costs of foreign operations (Hymer, 1960; Kindleberger, 1969; Caves, 1971). However, it
is hard to show that Korean ﬁrms in Western Europe possess any salient capabilities that
exceed those of local competitors. Rather, if Korean ﬁrms use local employees in high-wage,
advanced countries, they may lose their traditional advantages of producing at lower costs.
Taking these characteristics into account, we surmise that Korean multinationals tend to
invest in a country that o#ers locational factors that complement or strengthen their competi-
tive advantages. In this context, the following hypotheses are proposed and tested.
Hypothesis 1: Korean ﬁrms prefer a host country with a large domestic market
This hypothesis examines the importance of the domestic consumption market, and
assumes that large domestic markets provide more stability of demand. The stability of
demand in local markets enables Korean subsidiaries to achieve a higher level of economies of
scale, which allows them to minimize business failure in the early stages of operation.
Furthermore, when Korean ﬁrms adopt FDI as an extension to exports, stable host country
demand helps them maintain production capacities in the home country’s head o$ce. There is
another reason why economies of scale are particularly important for manufacturing in
Europe. Since Korean ﬁrms do not possess salient proprietary advantages compared with their
European competitors, they usually adopt a strategy of generating proﬁts by selling a large
volume of products on slight margins.
1 Thus, they prefer a host country with a large market
size in order to realize economies of scale in production. Studies have shown that market size
has a large and signiﬁcant e#ect on the location decisions of foreign ﬁrms (Kravis and Lipsey,
1982; Swamidass, 1990).
Hypothesis 2: Korean ﬁrms prefer a host country with low labor costs
As Korean ﬁrms have been competing in overseas markets mainly on the basis of product
prices, it is easily conjectured that they would prefer a country with low labor costs. That is,
since Korean subsidiaries in the EU usually compete in the range of low to medium-priced
products, low labor costs would be extremely important for the successful operation of their
European plants. Moreover, as more than 50 percent of Korean products manufactured in the
EU are classiﬁed as electronics goods, such as TVs, VCRs and microwave ovens, Korean
subsidiaries are engaged in the highly labor-intensive activities of product assembly. In this
1 Nonetheless, if Korean ﬁrms perceive the EU market as a completely integrated and homogenous market, the
domestic market size of a host country will not be an important factor.
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Many studies have conﬁrmed that high wage rates impose a negative impact on inward FDI
(Bartik, 1985; Luger and Shetty, 1985; Coughlin, Terza and Arromdee, 1991).
Hypothesis 3: Korean ﬁrms prefer a host country with large inﬂows of FDI
This hypothesis has been suggested for two major reasons. First, EU countries with large
inﬂows of FDI usually provide a friendly business environment for foreign manufacturers by
o#ering high levels of incentives and government assistance. Korean ﬁrms are also likely to
respond to the incentives of a host country to reduce the initial ﬁnancial investment cost.
Second, EU countries with large inﬂows of FDI tend to provide a favorable input market.
When Korean ﬁrms invest in a country where foreign manufacturing activities are prevalent,
they are likely to get easy access to necessary components and parts at reasonable prices.
Furthermore, like most multinationals from developing countries, Korean ﬁrms tend to use
standardized components and procure local inputs that compete on the basis of low prices
(Wells, 1983; Kumar 1982). Thus, it is essential for Korean multinationals to procure local
inputs at low prices in order to maintain their traditional competitiveness. Both a friendly
environment and favorable input markets help Korean ﬁrms to reduce the costs of manufac-
turing in the EU. Wheeler and Mody (1992) found that when U.S. ﬁrms undertake direct
investment overseas, the total existing level of FDI in a host country has a signiﬁcant impact
on this decision. Their results suggest that manufacturing agglomeration in the host country,
proxied by inward FDI, is an important factor in the location choice for U.S. direct
investment. Ulgado (1996) also contends that Japanese manufacturers place considerable
weight on geographic proximity to suppliers when they choose plant locations in the US.
Hypothesis 4: Korean ﬁrms prefer a host country with large Korean imports
This hypothesis suggests that Korean ﬁrms undertake FDI in order to defend export
markets. Most previous studies have indicated that the investment motives of MNEs from
developing countries are highly defensive, as they wish to protect their export markets from
trade restrictions imposed by advanced countries. Korean ﬁrms, particularly chaebols, strove
to utilize their excess production capacity at home through exports, but their massive exports
of low-priced products provoked European governments to impose trade regulations on
Korean imports. Several cases were found in which Korean electronics companies undertook
FDI to circumvent the trade barriers imposed by major European countries (McDermott,
1992; Gray and Hong, 1998).
Hypothesis 5: Korean ﬁrms prefer a host country with low ﬁnancial costs
Korean ﬁrms try to reduce ﬁnancial costs as well as production costs in order to maintain
price competitiveness. There are three major ﬁnancial costs that Korean manufacturing
subsidiaries face in the EU market: interest rates, tax burdens, and foreign exchange rate risk.
Several studies emphasize that interest rates in host countries are closely related with FDI. For
example, Euh and Min (1986) show that Korean manufacturing subsidiaries in foreign
countries ﬁnance more than 90 percent of their investment locally, which implies that high
interest rates in a host country may be a ﬁnancial burden.
2 Furthermore, when Korean ﬁrms
2 Korean manufacturing subsidiaries in foreign countries locally ﬁnanced 13 percent of their equity investment
and 93.9 percent of their loan investment.
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reduce both capital costs and foreign exchange risk. Thus, we expect this variable to be
signiﬁcant in location decisions.
Some studies report that taxes play an important role in determining the plant locations
of ﬁrms (Newman, 1983; Grubert and Mutti, 1991). The tax burden for foreign ﬁrms is mainly
comprised of property tax, corporate income tax, and personal income tax, though it is not
easy to comprehensively measure and estimate the e#ects of these taxes. Reasons for this
di$culty include the fact that there are many di#erent types of business property, all of which
are subject to di#erent tax rates within a country, and corporate income tax rates cover a wide
range, depending on the brackets of corporate income. In this study, corporate income tax was
treated as representative of the overall tax burden of a foreign ﬁrm, and was proxied by the
host government’s corporate tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.
We also note that Korean subsidiaries in the EU are subject to foreign exchange risk at
various stages of operation. When they ﬁnance their projects by loans from the home or third
countries, their debt payments vary with changes in the exchange rate of the local currency.
When they repatriate their proﬁts, their actual proﬁts also ﬂuctuate as exchange rates change.
Thus, Korean ﬁrms prefer to invest in countries with low exchange rate volatility in order to
limit foreign exchange risk. Cushman (1988) points out that FDI inﬂows in the USA respond
to exchange rate variability.
III. Methodology
Our model assumes that a multinational ﬁrm that has decided to open a new overseas
plant will locate its subsidiary to maximize its expected proﬁts. Each country has a di#erent set
of location-speciﬁc characteristics, and these characteristics bring unique advantages to each








ij ,( 1 )
where C0, M and as(s1, …, m) are unknown constants, Xsj(s1, …, m) are continuous
exogenous variables in country j, and eij is a location-speciﬁc random disturbance term that
captures the unique proﬁt advantages to ﬁrm i of operating in country j.




bkln Xkjeij,( 2 )
where bkak/M and C1lnC0/M.
Firm i locates in country j* provided that proﬁts are highest in country j*, i.e.,
pij *maxjpij, which requires that the right-hand side of equation (2) for country j* exceeds
that for any other country. Assuming that eij has an independent and identical Weibull











where Pj indicates the probability of selecting country j among J countries, bk indicates
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representing the characteristics of country j.
Assumptions behind the use of this equation need to be outlined. First, a ﬁrm’s probability
of choosing a potential location depends only on a function of the characteristics of that
location. Thus, the model speciﬁed above deals only with choice-speciﬁc attributes, regardless
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes that may a#ect the probability of choosing a location. Second, the
probability of choosing one location relative to another is constant, even when the number of
location choices changes. This “independence of irrelevant alternatives” assumption can be a
drawback when some choices are close substitutes.
3
IV. Empirical Results and Interpretation
Empirical Results
As mentioned earlier, from 1986 to 1997, Korean ﬁrms established 117 manufacturing
subsidiaries in eleven EU countries. Since the logit model includes only those alternative
location choices selected by decision makers, our choice set consists of these eleven countries.
The estimation of parameters in the model needs a data set for the host country of each foreign
plant. The dependent variable takes the value “1” for the chosen country and “0” for the other
ten countries in each of the decisions for host country selection. The independent variables
represent the locational characteristics of each of the chosen eleven countries. GDP and
earnings per hour in manufacturing are incorporated in the model to measure market size and
labor costs, respectively. The value of Korean imports into each EU country is measured by
the proportion of Korean imports out of that EU country’s total imports. This is in order to
take the size e#ects into account. Interest rates, tax burden, and foreign exchange risk are
measured by money market rates corrected for the e#ects of inﬂation, corporate tax revenue
by government as a percentage of GDP, and the ﬁve-year variance of annual changes of a
currency’s parity to SDR, respectively. Table 1 presents the construction of independent
3 This assumption, which indicates that disturbances are independent, is required for the estimation of parame-
ters in the conditional logit model.








LGDP GDP (US$ billion)  OECD, NSO
LIMK Proportion of Korean imports in total imports (US$ million)  IMF
LFDI Amount of inward foreign direct investment (US$ billion)  IMD
LWAGE Earnings per hour in manufacturing (US$)  ILO
LINT Real money market rates (%)  IMF
LTAX Corporate tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (%)  OECD
LERV Annual changes of exchange rate (5-year variance)  IMF
DUM Dummy variable for 1992 market integration 
Notes: The variables, the names of which start with ‘L’, indicate that they have been transformed in natural
logarithm. For a detailed explanation of the sources, refer to the references.
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expected to have positive signs while LWAGE, LINT, LTAX, and LERV are expected to have
negative signs. DUM, a dummy variable intended to test the e#ect of EU market integration
in 1992, is also expected to be positive.
The existence of linear correlation among the independent variables was examined before
model estimation (Table 2). Our correlation analysis revealed no linear relationship between
any two explanatory variables with none of the correlation coe$cients exceeding 0.50._Thus,
these variables can be included simultaneously in a model without worrying about multicol-
linearity.
Table 3 summarizes the statistical results of the ﬁve models. All the models except model
(5) included variables such as LGDP, LFDI, LWAGE, LINT, LIMK, and LTAX, which
were instrumental in testing the hypotheses of this study. Model (1) represents a basic model
that includes these six variables. Model (2) is obtained by adding LERV to model (1) to see
whether exchange volatility had an impact on the dependent variable. Model (3) adds DUM
T67A: 2. CDGG:A6I>DC M6IG>M D; EMEA6C6IDGN V6G>67A:H
LGDP LFDI LWAGE LINT LIMK LTAX LERV
LGDP 1.000 0.452 0.433 0.125 0.309 0.092 0.112
LFDI 1.000 0.098 0.067 0.107 0.387 0.086
LWAGE 1.000 0.314 0.008 0.064 0.450
LINT 1.000 0.018 0.038 0.021
LIMK 1.000 0.150 0.148
LTAX 1.000 0.029
LERV 1.000
T67A: 3. R:<G:HH>DC R:HJAIH 7N MD9:AH
Explanatory
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LGDP 0.82** 0.85** 0.81** 0.85** 0.85**
(4.60) (4.66) (4.55) (4.62) (5.02)
LFDI 0.33** 0.31** 0.33** 0.31** 0.29**
(2.77) (2.59) (2.78) (2.59) (2.91)
LWAGE 1.03** 1.17** 1.02** 1.16** 0.99**
(3.13) (3.34) (3.10) (3,33) (3.07)
LINT 0.40* 0.38* 0.39* 0.37* 0.44**
(2.21) (2.08) (2.16) (2.02) (2.53)
LIMK 0.75** 0.81** 0.74** 0.80** 0.74**
(2.88) (3.06) (2.83) (3.02) (2.85)
LTAX 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.16 
(0.63) (0.40) (0.70) (0.45)
LERV  0.41  0.43 
(1.14) (1.19)
DUM  29.26 29.34 
(0.00) (0.00)
LL 221.94 221.30 220.66 219.96 222.15
c2 117.20** 118.50** 119.77** 121.17** 116.80**
Notes: Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. The asterisks such as * and ** indicate significance at
the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. LL represents log-likelihood ratio statistics.
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decision. Model (4) adds both the LERV and DUM variables into model (1). Model (5) is
based on model (1) excluding LTAX, which was insigniﬁcant in the other four models. The
ﬁve models explain the dependent variable equally well, with almost the same overall ﬁtness, as
represented by c
2.
4 In these models, the four variables of LGDP, LFDI, LWAGE, and LIMK
were statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level among the eight possible explanatory variables,
and LINT was also signiﬁcant at the 1% level in model (5) and at the 5% level in the other
models.
The estimated coe$cients of all of these ﬁve explanatory variables, LGDP, LFDI,
LWAGE, LINT, and LIMK, were stable in all the models examined, and ranged from 0.81 to
0.85, 0.29 to 0.33, 1.17 to 0.99, 0.44 to 0.37, and 0.74 to 0.81, respectively. Note that all
these coe$cient estimates were highly stable and varied within a very narrow range, implying
the consistent inﬂuence of these variables on the locational decisions of Korean ﬁrms.
However, three variables, LTAX, LERV, and DUM, failed to show an acceptable level of
statistical signiﬁcance.
We also estimated the elasticities of the probability with respect to the above ﬁve
signiﬁcant independent variables using the following equation, which is derived from equation
(3).
(ln Pj/(ln Xkjbk(1Pj)( 4 )
As our choice set consists of eleven countries, Pj equals one-eleventh on average, and bk
can be replaced by the estimated coe$cient of each variable in model (5). Table 4 shows how
much the dependent variable (the probability that a country is selected by Korean ﬁrms) tends
to change when each of the independent variables (country-speciﬁc characteristics) changes by
one percent. According to the result, even a marginal change in LWAGE can have a
considerable inﬂuence on the likelihood that a particular EU country is selected by Korean
ﬁrms, which suggests that Korean ﬁrms are highly sensitive to the wage levels in a host
country. It is also noticeable that LGDP and LIMK have higher elasticities than LFDI and
LINT.
Interpretation
The empirical results suggest the following. First, the market size of a host country is
critical in the location decisions of Korean ﬁrms. It is believed that Korean ﬁrms wish to
achieve stable local demand and take advantage of economies of scale, as most multinationals
from developing countries tend to rely on their price competitiveness to survive in foreign
4 c
2 statistics are calculated as 2{LLLL(slopes0)} and have degrees of freedom equal to the number of
independent variables.
T67A: 4. EA6HI>8>I>:H D; IC9:E:C9:CI V6G>67A:H
Variable LGDP LFDI LWAGE LINT LIMK
Elasticity 0.77 0.26 0.90 0.40 0.67
Notes: Elasticities represent the relative change in the average probability of each EU country’s
accommodation to Korean new plants given one percent change in each of the independent variables.
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of local markets. Another interpretation of this result is that Korean investments in the EU
target the domestic market of a host country, rather than using the host country as a
bridgehead to serve the entire EU market. This implies that Korean ﬁrms still do not perceive
the EU market as a completely homogeneous market. One previous study conﬁrms that
Korean subsidiaries in the EU aim to sell more than 30 percent of their output in the domestic
market of a host country (Hong, 1996). Considering the importance of local market size,
Korean ﬁrms have concentrated their facilities in the three largest countries. From 1986 to
1997, 89 Korean plants, 76% of the total, were located in the U.K., France, and Germany.
Second, Korean ﬁrms take into account the wage rates of a host country when they
establish plants in the EU. Several large Korean companies have established assembly plants
for consumer electronics in the EU, mainly to avoid anti-dumping duties, and these plants are
highly labor-intensive as sophisticated components are typically imported from the Korean-
based headquarters rather than being locally produced. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
Korean ﬁrms prefer to invest in a country with low labor costs, which is essential to keep their
products at reasonable prices.
Third, Korean investors prefer countries that accommodate more FDI. This has two
implications with regards to the entry strategies of Korean ﬁrms. First, they wish to beneﬁt
from the e#ects of manufacturing agglomeration, since a country favored by other foreign
ﬁrms provides an excellent input market with readily available components and parts. Second,
a country where a large number of foreign ﬁrms prevail is more likely to provide a business
environment favorable to foreign investors, including investment incentives and other FDI-
related policies.
5 Thus, this type of environment is appealing to Korean ﬁrms.
Fourth, Korean ﬁrms prefer to invest in countries that usually have a high proportion of
Korean imports, suggesting that Korean ﬁrms have undertaken direct investments in the EU
in order to defend their export markets. It is well known that major Korean electronics
companies set up assembly plants in order to circumvent anti-dumping suits imposed by the
EU in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They selected the UK, France, and Germany for plant
locations, because these countries had previously been major importers of their products and,
as a result, were familiar to Korean companies. The high signiﬁcance of LIMK indicates that
the strategies of Korean ﬁrms in the EU are highly defensive and sequential.
6
Fifth, interest rates had a considerable e#ect on the location patterns of Korean ﬁrms in
the EU. This result suggests that Korean subsidiaries in the EU wanted to rely more on local
ﬁnancing and less on internal funds from their parent ﬁrms. This might have been largely
motivated by a desire to avoid higher interest rates at home. As another implication, Korean
ﬁrms did not seem to perceive the ﬁnancial markets of the EU countries as homogenous,
5 To conﬁrm that Korean ﬁrms prefer a country where other foreign ﬁrms have already invested, Korean FDI
in each country was regressed by lagged value of that country’s total FDI inﬂows, using the ﬁxed e#ect model.
The estimation results showed positive and signiﬁcant e#ects of total FDI inﬂows on Korean FDI.
6 As an anonymous referee indicated, the defensive strategy of Korean investments can be incorporated into the
model by using trade frictions between Korea and EU countries. After substituting this variable for LIMK, the
estimation did not generate any robust results by weakening the signiﬁcance of other variables and failing to show
its own signiﬁcance. This result derives from the fact that trade frictions are not varied across the countries
because trade barriers are generally applied to all EU member countries simultaneously under the common EU
trade policy.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +**despite the activities of the European Monetary System. The importance of host-country
interest rates is expected to diminish when EU countries further integrate their ﬁnancial
markets through the use of a single currency.
Lastly, the coe$cients of tax burden and foreign exchange risk were not statistically
signiﬁcant in the models, despite having the correct signs. These results imply that Korean
ﬁrms do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant di#erence in tax rates and exchange rate volatility among EU
countries, which contrasts with the fact that they do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant di#erence in interest
rates. The insigniﬁcance of exchange rate variation might result from the ﬁxed exchange rate
system adopted by EU countries, which restricts exchange rate variation in the EU. The
insigniﬁcant e#ect of integration might result from the fact that integration was heralded
before 1992 and any investment adjustment had already been made by 1992.
V. Conclusions
This paper employed the conditional logit model to analyze the location selection
decisions of Korean multinationals that established manufacturing plants in the EU. The
empirical results suggest that Korean ﬁrms prefer to invest in host countries that have a large
domestic market, more inward FDI, low wage rates, low interest rates, and large Korean
imports. This implies that Korean multinationals in the EU are highly conscious of production
costs, and consider the importance of labor costs and economies of scale. Their strategies are
characterized as defensive, because they have been anxious to protect their export markets.
They have also tried to minimize the risk of business failure in the unfamiliar EU market by
concentrating their facilities in countries where foreign ﬁrms have had successfully settled. In
summary, Korean ﬁrms in the EU show strategies that are cost-conscious, market-defensive,
geographically concentrated, and risk-averse, probably because their investments in the EU are
at early stages that are heavily associated with labor-intensive activities.
The empirical results imply that Korean ﬁrms pursued location-selection strategies
suitable to producing standardized products at low costs. Our empirical results also suggest
that EU countries can attract direct investment from Korea by providing industrial areas
where Korean ﬁrms can obtain a ready supply of labor, standardized components, and
agglomeration economies.
Further studies will be needed to investigate whether or not these locational strategies can
be similarly applicable to Korean FDI outside the EU market. This will help us to isolate the
unique characteristics of the EU market from general locational strategies of Korean MNEs.
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